When reading The Occidental Quarterly (TOQ), one is struck by the near lack of discussion of an outstanding fact: the failure of Western females to reproduce adequately. Isn't this at least a possible cause of the phenomenon stressed in TOQ: the mass migration of people from the Third World to Europe and North America? The females of the Third World are more than adequately reproducing. This sets up pressure on people to move from the Third World to Europe and North America. There is excess population growth as well as grinding poverty in the former; there is low population growth and some actual population decline and great riches in the latter. As a result, there is movement from the former to the latter. And principle No. 4 of the TOQ ("Immigration into the United States should be restricted to selected people of European ancestry.") is impossible to implement. There are no Europeans, or "people of European ancestry" (e.g., white South Africans, most Australians, most New Zealanders, most Canadians, most Argentines, most Uruguayans, most Costa Ricans, etc.), to migrate.
What are the reported facts? In Europe, every country has a Total Fertility Rate (TFR), the best estimate we have of the average number of children women in that country have in a lifetime, estimated to be below 2.1, the number required for a very low mortality population to replace itself, and has for over 30 years.1 In many countries, we are into a second generation of females having below-replacement fertility. In North America, there is also below-replacement fertility. In Canada, in 2004, it is 1.5.2 The non-Hispanic white (the Euro-American) in the USA had a TFR of 1.8 in 2002.3 In Europe, the TFRs in some of the main Mediterranean countries (Italy, Greece, Spain) are around 1.34 Populations are not being replaced because they are not reproducing.
Let us look at Lynn and Vanhanen's IQ and the Wealth of Nations.5 It shows that the higher the average IQ of the population of a country, the richer the country. So, we should expect the highest IQ countries, the Mongoloid (East Asian) populations, to have below-replacement fertility. And they do: Japan (1.3), South Korea (1.2), Taiwan (1.2), Singapore (1.3), China (1.7), Hong Kong (0.9).6 (This should put to rest one of Gil Caldwell's fears: that the Mongoloids will replace the Caucasoids in Europe. This is not his main fear, however.7) Thailand is rapidly becoming developed, and its TFR reflects this (1.7).8 The populations of the developed world are, in effect, being extinguished by affluence.
What women are having the babies that can be found in North America, Europe, and East Asia? Not the educated ones. They're postponing having children, or not having any at all. Both Margaret Sanger and Marie Stopes, Britain's great sex education and birth control crusader, worried about this,9 namely, that the women who adopted contraception would be mainly the educated ones.10 So, our campuses are devoid of children. There are plenty of women of child-bearing age there, but very few children. Children get in the way of education. Our institutes of higher learning have become, in effect, sterilization factories.
The inverse relationship between luxury and fertility is not a new phenomenon. In 1775, Benjamin Franklin observed: "The greater the common fashionable Expence of any rank of people, the more cautious they are of Marriage. Therefore, luxury should never be suffer'd to become common."11 And before him Polybius: "In our time all Greece was visited by a dearth of children and generally a decay of population this evil grew upon us rapidly, and without attracting attention, by our men becoming perverted to a passion for show and money and the pleasures of an idle life, and accordingly either not marrying at all, or, if they did marry, refusing to rear the children that were born, or at most one or two out of a great number, for the sake of leaving them well off or bringing them up in extravagant luxury."12 As Tenney Frank, a classical historian, noted, "The race of the human animal survives by means of instincts that shaped themselves for that purpose long before rational control came into play. Before our day it has only been at Greece and Rome that these impulses have had to face sophistication."13 And as Solzhenitsyn said to us in our own day, in his infamous Harvard commencement address, "Even biology tells us that a high degree of habitual well-being is not advantageous to a living organism. Today, well-being in the life of Western society has begun to take off its pernicious mask."14 Lynn and Vanhanen don't mention this untidy fact in their book.
How do we account for this maladaptive response to luxury by the human organism? The sociobiologist asks how it might have been adaptive in the conditions under which it originally evolved. Lorenz, for example, presents the following evolutionary model of this response: "At the time of its probable origin humanity eked out a precarious existence. Hence it bears all the marks of a selection pressure working in the direction of the utmost economy. At the dawn of humanity, men could not afford to pay too high a price for anything. They had to be extremely reluctant to make any expenditure of any kind of energy, of risk, or of possessions. Laziness, gluttony, and some other present-day vices were virtues then. To shun everything disagreeable, like cold, danger, muscular exertion and so on, was the wisest thing they could do. Life was hard enough to exclude all danger of becoming too 'soft.' These were the circumstances to which our mechanism balancing pleasure and displeasure has been adapted in evolution. They must be kept in mind in order to understand its current miscarriage."15 Barkow and Burley's model (discussed below) is similar in spirit to that of Lorenz.
Darwin, by the way, accepted the general argument that civilization had certain perverse evolutionary effects: "With savages, the weak in body or mind are soon eliminated; and those that survive exhibit a vigorous state of health. We civilized men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the process of elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute poor-laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of every one to the last moment. Thus the weak members of civilized societies propagate their kind. No one who has attended to the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this must be highly injurious to the race of man." But he did not counsel harshness: "The surgeon must harden himself whilst performing an operation, for he knows that he is acting for the good of his patient; but if we were intentionally to neglect the weak and helpless, it could only be for a contingent benefit, with a great and certain present evil. Hence we must bear without complaining the undoubtedly bad effects of the weak surviving and propagating their kind."16 Toward the end of his life, however, he got even gloomier about the prospects of civilized peoples,17 given the tendency toward mercy on the part of these peoples.
So, Spengler seems to have been right. Civilized and affluent peoples have lost their fear of extinction.18 That seems to be one of the costs or effects of civilization and affluence. As Spengler put it: "... there suddenly emerges into the bright light of history a phenomenon that has long been preparing itself underground and now steps forward to make an end to the dramathe sterility of civilized man. This is not something that can be grasped as a plain matter of Causality (as modern science naturally enough has tried to grasp it); it is to be understood as an essentially metaphysical turn towards death. The last man of the world-city no longer wants to livehe may cling to life as an individual, but not as a type, as an aggregate, for it is characteristic of this collective existence that it eliminates the terror of death. That which strikes the true peasant with a deep and inexplicable fear, the notion that the family and the name may be extinguished, has now lost its meaning. The continuance of the blood-relation in the visible world is no longer a duty of the blood, and the destiny of being the last of the line is no longer felt as a doom. Children do not happen, not because children have become impossible, but principally because intelligence at the peak of intensity can no longer find any reason for their existence now emerges the Ibsen woman, the comrade, the heroine of a whole metropolitan literature from Northern drama to Parisian novel. Instead of children, she has soul-conflicts; marriage is a craft-art for the achievement of 'mutual understanding. It is all the same whether the case against children is the American lady's who would not miss a season for anything, or the Parisian's who fears that her lover would leave her, or an Ibsen heroine's who belongs to herselfthey all belong to themselves and they are all unfruitful. The same fact, in conjuncture with the same arguments, is to be found in the Alexandrian, in the Roman, and as a matter of course, in every other civilized societyand conspicuously in that in which Buddha grew up. And in Hellenism and in the nineteenth century, as in the times of Lao-Tzu and the Charvaka doctrine, there is an ethic for childless intelligences, and a literature about the inner conflicts of Nora and Nana At this level all civilizations enter upon a state, which lasts for centuries, of appalling depopulation."19
The best, and, as far as I know, the only model of this phenomenon is that to be found in the articles by Barkow and Burley and by Burley.20 Intelligence, argue Barkow and Burley, obviously conferred upon its possessors tremendous selective advantages. In no other way are we able to explain the explosive growth of the hominid brain in the past million years.21 No other organ in the history of life has grown faster."22 At the same time, the enhancement of intelligence increased the females' appreciation of and foresight as to the dangers, pains, and inconvenience of child birth and child rearing and thereby her will to control her fertility, thus potentially threatening her fitness. As a consequence, other traits, both cultural and innate, evolved to counter the one great disadvantage of intelligence, namely that it would cause its possessors, particularly females, to underreproduce. Examples of such traits are concealed ovulation (unique to the human), continuous sexual receptivity and strong sexual desire ("[h]uman beings are unique among the primates in the intensity and variety of their sexual activity"23), male dominance, and pro-natalist dogmas and ideologies. "With the growth of intelligence," write Barkow and Burley, "early hominid females eventually understood the relationship between ovulation, copulation, and fertilization. They used this new knowledge to control their fertility, reducing it to the point of eliminating their genes from the gene pool. Since intelligence itself was of high adaptive value, selection reduced not female intelligence but awareness of ovulation." The universality of pro-natalist dogmas likewise suggests a reluctance on the part of females to bear children. "Why should so many societies both pressure and reward women if women were not reluctant to have children ?" Barkow and Burley ask. In fact, a whole complex of cultural and genetic traits, which Barkow and Burley describe, evolved to prevent women from using their intelligence to suppress their reproduction.
The modern economy, however, typically provides women with both the autonomy (e.g., freedom from male dominance, equal opportunity for employment in the money economy) and the means (e.g., efficient and safe access to birth control) to thwart the various devices which had evolved, in turn, to thwart the human female's predisposition to underreproduce. Furthermore, the higher the intelligence of the woman in the modern setting, the greater her access to situations in society which will allow her the autonomy she requires to be able to suppress reproduction as well as the greater the foresight of the pains and inconvenience of child birth and child rearing and hence the greater the will to use the contraceptive devices that modernization provides her. Sex, in which both the human male and human female have an exceptional interest relative to other mammals,24 can likewise be enjoyed by the more intelligent without the consequences of childbearing, though Kinsey reported the more educated to be less sexually active as well.25 In short, despite its overall adaptive value, intelligence in the modern setting leads to maladaptive behavior. The dysgenic consequences of this pattern are obvious.
Let me conclude with a brief remark on Caldwell's "Two Models of White Racialism."26 His scheme is, briefly, as follows: The first is the ethic of universalism (evidently a kind of disease among white people) and the second of expansionism (which whites did not apologize for until, say, 1950).27 But there is a third model: a kind of, for want of a better phrase, enlightened pessimism. This is the model of, among others, Veblen (perhaps America's greatest social scientist), Spengler, the author of The Camp of the Saints (Jean Raspail28), the author of Civilization and Its Discontents (Freud), the author of Law of Civilization and Decay: An Essay on History (Brooks Adams, the younger brother of Henry Adams), et al. Some due has to be paid their ideas.
Raymond Cattell29 wrote that each country is a kind of evolutionary experiment. Now, we have the countries of the developed world committing a kind of demographic suicide. We don't know why this happens but it seems to happen regularly with the emergence of affluence and civilization, which demand absolute monogamy30 and birth control. Both lead, it seems, to below-replacement fertility. Recall that it was posited above that Homo sapiens had evolved, via concealed ovulation, in such a way as to circumvent the tendency of intelligent females to suppress fertility. The evolution of Homo sapiens has not yet found a way to circumvent the state of affluence and civilization to propel populations in this state to replacement fertility. Countries in this state do not seem to attain replacement fertility after the demographic transition. As it stands, no country's population is able to attain civilization (and the riches that accompany it) and replacement-level fertility simultaneously.
What's happening may be seen like this. In former times, cities were very unhealthy places. Their populations had to be replenished by migration from the countryside.31 Now, the more developed countries are like these cities. For whatever reason, their populations are unable to replenish themselves. These populations have to be replenished by the importation of persons from the less developed countries. Thus, the third-worldization of the West and, eventually, the Far East, and its attendant problems.32
1. For a discussion of below-replacement fertility, see "Fertility, Below-Replacement," in P. Demeny and G. McNicoll, eds., Encyclopedia of Population (New York: Macmillan, 2003), pp. 405409. See also Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, Replacement Migration, New York, 1997. For statistics on the TFRs of countries of the developed world, see J. Sardon, "Recent Demographic Trends in the Developed Countries," Population (English edition) 57 (2002), pp. 111156. To anticipate a possible criticism, the 1930s in the U.S. were nothing like what's happening now. The TFRs hovered just above 2.1 in the 1930s, while today they have plunged below replacement and stayed there for over 30 years. See Fertility Tables for Birth Cohorts by Color: United States, 191773, DHEW Publication No. 76-1152, United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1976. In Europe, on the other hand, there does seem to have been a sustained below-replacement fertility in this decade. See D. Kirk, Europe's Population in the Interwar Years (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), pp. 5457. This below-replacement fertility was made up for in the postWorld War II years, 19451965, however. See "Baby Boom, Post World War II," in Demeny and McNicoll, Encyclopedia of Population, pp. 7377. There has not been a comparable "recuperation," as demographers call it, in post-1970 below-replacement fertility in the West and Far East, and none is contemplated.
The only exception to the fact of below-replacement fertility in the developed world that I know of is Israel (Israel's population is defined as the population in pre-1967 Israel, East Jerusalem [annexed in 1967], the Golan Heights [annexed in 1982], and the settlers of the West Bank and Gaza), a kind of Western insertion into the Middle East. Israeli Jews (Israel is about 20% non-Jewish) had a TFR of 2.6 in 2002 (see Statistical Abstract of Israel 2003, p. 333). This is clearly political, as the Moslems in Israel, the vast majority of non-Jews in Israel (as well as in Greater Israel [Israel proper plus the West Bank and the Gaza Strip]), had a TFR of 4.6 (see, again, Statistical Abstract of Israel 2003, p. 333; a detailed article on the demography of Palestine is P. Farques, "Protracted National Conflict and Fertility Change: Palestinians and Israelis in the Twentieth Century," Population and Development Review 26[3] [2000], pp. 441482). In fact, the Jews of Israel have a phrase for this demographic competition: "the demographic problem."
The "demographic problem" is not unique to Israel, though rarely is it explicitly discussed as such. Lebanon, which the French had left as the only Christian country in the Middle East, has not had a census since 1932, for fear that Muslims might outnumber Christians there (see W. Stanton, Rapid Growth of Human Populations 17502000: Histories, Consequences, Issues, Nation by Nation [Brentwood, Essex, UK: Multi-Science Publishing Co., 2004], for more on Lebanon). The trouble that Nigeria has had with its censuses is due to the differential growth of its different groups and states there. And the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, before it gained power in India, worried aloud that the Muslims were growing faster than the Hindus because they were not practicing family planning as diligently. The list goes on.
Federalism (e.g., a federal Iraq, as is recommended by P. Galbraith in his "Iraq: The Bungled Transition," The New York Review of Books 51[14] [September 23, 2004], pp. 7074, whereby Iraq would be divided into a Kurdish north, a Sunni center, and a Shiite south, the Ottoman empire's three ethno-provinces) or partition has been preached by some but is not recommended by Eibl-Eibesfeldt in his book, Human Ethology (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1989) when there are growth differentials ("In multi-ethnic states, federalistic structures allow different ethnic groups self-government within certain bounds and in cooperation with the other groups sharing a superordinate interest on the basis of reciprocity. This can work as long as such a social contract implies that differential reproduction at cost of the other is avoided, since ethnic groups are very sensitive to domination by others." [p. 622]), as there are in the U.S., where the Hispanic of Mexican origin has a TFR of 2.9, whereas the non-Hispanic white has a TFR of 1.8 (2002). If Eibl-Eibesfeldt is right, wouldn't that greatly vitiate or, at least, illuminate TOQ's principle No. 7, "Federal decentralization and territorial separation should be recognized as legitimate and humane means of preventing and resolving divisive social, ethnic, and racial conflicts"?
The only exceptions (among countries exceeding 1 million) to above-replacement fertility in the developing world are Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago, and Sri Lanka. Cuba currently has a TFR of 1.6 (see Population Reference Bureau, 2004 World Population Data Sheet) and has had below replacement fertility, it seems, at least since 1978 (see Cuban Studies - Estudios Cubanos 13[1] [Winter 1983], pp. 7879). Trinidad and Tobago currently has a TFR of 1.6 (many of the small Caribbean islands of the Lesser Antilles, like Barbados and Dominica, have below-replacement level fertility) and Sri Lanka of 2.0 (see, again, Population Reference Bureau, 2004 World Population Data Sheet). Interestingly, both Cuba and Sri Lanka have explicitly anti-spatial concentration policies (see D. Vining, "Population Redistribution towards Core Areas of Less Developed Countries, 19501980," International Regional Science Review 10[1], 1986, pp. 145); all developing countries do, but only Cuba and Sri Lanka have actually carried them out over the years.
The implications of persistently below-replacement fertility for the West are beginning to trickle into the mainstream press and even academe. See, for the mainstream press, I. Fisher, "Redefined Boundaries and Uneasy Transformations," New York Times, April 25, 2004, p. 4; N. Ferguson, "Eurabia?," New York Times Magazine, April 4, 2004, pp. 13, 17; M. Landler, "Empty Maternity Wards Imperil a Dwindling Germany," New York Times, November 18, 2004, p. A3; and A. Colwell, "Demographic Time Bomb Threatens Pensions in Europe," New York Times, November 26, 2004, p. A3; and, for academe, the interview with Samuel Huntington in the New York Times Magazine, May 2, 2004, p. 21, and the letters that were printed commenting on this interview in the May 16 Magazine, mainly decrying the interviewer's patronizing use of the word WASP (Samuel Francis has also written a quite illuminating column on this example of WASP-bashing in his column, "What Do We Mean by 'Us,'" Middle American News [June 2004], p. 14), on the occasion of the publication of his book, Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004). There is a quite long review of that book in The New Yorker, May 17, 2004, pp. 9298, by fellow Harvard professor, Louis Menand. He writes, "The most inflammatory section of 'Who Are We?' is the chapter on Mexican immigration Huntington's account of the nature of Mexican immigration to the United States seems deliberately alarmist. He notes, for example, that roughly two-thirds of Mexican immigrants have been illegal…. But, as Mae Ngai points out in 'Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America'…, a work a hundred times more nuanced than Huntington's, the surge in illegal immigration was the predictable consequence of the reform of the immigration laws of 1965. Originally, Western Hemisphere countries were exempted from specific quotas, but the act was amended in 1976, and Mexico was assigned the same annual quota (twenty thousand) as, for example, Belgium. This effectively illegalized a large portion of the Mexican immigrant population" (pp. 9697). To the 100 nuances of Ms. Ngai's book should be added one more: Reading and reporting on the testimony before various Congressional committees and sub-committees concerning this "act." Americans were many times reassured and promised that the "Act" of 1965 would change neither the composition nor the level of immigration, which had been quite low and heavily European in the period 19201965 (see O. Graham, Unguarded Gates: A History of America's Immigration Crisis [Lanham, MD: Rowhan and Littlefield, 2004], especially Chapter 10, pp. 8797, 217218). Professor Menand should stick to subjects he knows something about, and stay away from subjects like immigration, about which he does not know much. Huntington's book is also reviewed by Michiko Kakutani ("An Identity Crisis for Norman Rockwell America," New York Times, May 29, 2004, pp. E29, E38), who characterizes it as "riddled with gross generalizations" and "pockmarked with perplexing contradictions" and ends up calling its arguments "familiar." Familiar? I may be out of touch here in academe, but I hardly think that anything on the dangers of multiethnicity is "familiar" to even well-read Americans. Andrew Hacker, on the other hand, gives it a fair, if perfunctory, review ("Patriot Games," The New York Review of Books 51[11] [June 24, 2004], pp. 2831) and seems generally resigned to "the third-world workforce now residing in our midst." A thoughtful review of this book is A. Hennessy, "Son of a Thousand Fathers," Times Literary Supplement, September 24, 2004, p. 9.
John Tanton, in his "Vatican Capitulates," The Social Contract 14(3) (Spring 2004), pp. 229231, discusses the below-replacement fertility of Italy and its implications for the future of that peninsula. But this essay is about alone in its frank discussion of the implications of below-replacement fertility for the West.
2. See Population Reference Bureau, 2004 World Population Data Sheet.
3. See "Reproduction Rates for 19902002 and Intrinsic Rates for 20002001: United States," National Vital Statistics Reports 52(17) (March 18, 2004). The TFRs of individual states vary quite a bit, ranging from 2.54 in Utah to 1.60 in Vermont in the lower 48 states. See page 46, "Births: Final Data for 2002," National Vital Statistics Reports 52(10) (Dec. 17, 2003). Neither has a large Hispanic population (about 1% in both), and so the high TFR of Utah cannot be due to Hispanic immigration. As a matter of fact, both are overwhelmingly white (2.11 million out a total population of 2.28 million in Utah, or 92.5%, .58 million out of a total of .60 million in Vermont, or 96.7%, see U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey Profiles 2002 at http://www.census.gov/acs). Rather, it is clearly due to Mormon culture (70% of Utah's population is Mormon, see New York Times, July 31, 2004, p. A13), which is very demanding of females concerning reproduction. The percentage of Utah's female population that has a bachelor's degree or higher was 22.3% in 2000 (the percentage in the country as a whole was 22.8%), while that of Vermont was 29.5% in 2000 (see U.S. Census Bureau, Educational Attainment by Sex: 2000, QT-P20). This just reinforces the need for more study of culture in biocultural studies, as is argued by Mackey (see note 20 below).
4. See Population Reference Bureau, 2004 World Population Data Sheet.
5. R. Lynn and T. Vanhanen, IQ and the Wealth of Nations (Westport. CT: Praeger, 2002).
6. Population Reference Bureau, 2004 World Population Data Sheet.
7. See G. Caldwell, "Two Models of White Racialism: A Preliminary Exploration of a Changing Morality," The Occidental Quarterly 3(4) (Winter 2003/2004), pp. 1326.
8. Population Reference Bureau, 2004 World Population Data Sheet.
9. See R. Hall, Passionate Crusader: The Life of Marie Stopes, especially page 326 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977); also J. Rose, Marie Stopes and the Sexual Revolution (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1992).
10. See D. Kennedy, Birth Control in America: The Career of Margaret Sanger (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), especially page 120.
11. B. Franklin, "Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries, etc.," Gentlemen's Quarterly (November 1755); reprinted in Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 13 (Summer 1970), pp. 469475, quotation on page 473.
12. E. Shuckburg, The Histories of Polybius, vol. 2, translated from F. Hultusch (London: Macmillan, 1887), quotation on page 510. K. Hopkins, in his Death and Renewal:Sociological Studies in Roman History, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1983, reports that most Roman emperors exhorted their senators to have more children and shows that there was below-replacement fertility in the Roman empire.
13. T. Frank, "Race Mixture in the Roman Empire," American Historical Review 21 (1916), pp. 689708, quotation on page 704.
14. R. Berman, Solzhenitsyn at Harvard, The Address, Twelve Early Responses, and Six Later Reflections (Washington, DC: Ethics and Policy Center, 1980), quotation on page 7. Infamous because (1) he gave the commencement address in Russian (though he, helpfully, provided a translator or a translation [it is not clear to me which]), (2) in general, harangued the proud graduates and their proud parents like an Old Testament prophet in some strange tongue, at one point, while indulging himself in a diatribe about Americans' obsession with happiness, actually uttering the line, "if...man were born to be happy, he wouldn't be born to die," and (3) took the Harvard motto, veritas, much too seriously, thinking the Harvard graduates would want to hear the truth, at one point talking about a bill the Third World was about to present to the West that he doubted very much the West could afford to pay and at another point declaring American music "intolerable." Needless to say, a huge uproar ensued, and Solzhenitsyn was never invited to give a commencement address again anywhere.
15. K. Lorenz, "The Enmity between Generations and Its Probable Ethological Causes," Studium Generale 23 (1970), pp. 963997, quotation on pages 978979.
16. As quoted in M. Bulmer, Francis Galton: Pioneer of Heredity and Biometry (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), p. 98, from C. Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, 2 vols. (London: Murray, 1871). Reprinted 1981, Princeton University Press.
17. See J. Jopson, "The Language of Degeneration: Eugenic Ideas in The Time Machine by H.G. Wells and Man and Superman by George Bernard Shaw," The Galton Institute Newsletter 51 (June 2004), pp. 116, especially page 2.
18. P. McDonald, in his "Low Fertility in Australia: Evidence, Causes, and Policy Responses," People and Place 8(2), 2000, pp. 621, gives a good summary of the demographers' explanations of the phenomenon of low fertility in developed countries (like Australia) but seems rather pessimistic about the likelihood of any country ever implementing the reforms necessary to raise these fertility rates, given these reforms' formidable expense. See also his "Sustaining Fertility through Public Policy: The Range of Options," Population (English edition) 57(3) (2002), pp. 417446.
19. O. Spengler, The Decline of the West, vol. 2(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1928), quotation on pages 103105.
20. J. Barkow and N. Burley, "Human Fertility, Evolutionary Biology, and the Demographic Transition," Ethology and Sociobiology 1 (1980), pp. 163180; N. Burley, "The Evolution of Concealed Ovulation," The American Naturalist 114 (1979), pp. 835858. There is an impatience, however, with the lack of interest among students of human sociobiology/ethology in the cultural side of biocultural studies; culture obviously has a tremendous impact on the state of contemporary society, in, for example, the differential reproduction rates of Muslims and Christians or Jews (see, for example, W. Mackey, "Homo Sapiens Is Biocultural or Is Not: Some Rubicons Are Wider Than Others," Human Ethology Bulletin 15[3] [September 2000], pp. 23).
21. E. Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), quotation on page 87.
22. L. Godfrey and K. Jacobs, "Gradual, Autocatalytic and Punctuational Models of Hominid Brain Evolution: A Cautionary Tale," Journal of Human Evolution 10 (1981), pp. 255272.
23. E. Wilson, op. cit., quotation on page 140.
24. E. Wilson, op. cit.
25. J. Haldane, "Alfred Kinsey," Hindu Weekly Review, October 8, 1956. Reprinted in C. Christenson, Kinsey: A Biography (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971), pp. 228230. D. Perusse's article, "Cultural and Reproductive Success in Industrial Societies: Testing the Relationship at the Proximate and Ultimate Levels," Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1993), pp. 267322, shows, however, that high-status males in Montreal copulate more than low-status males, though questions have been raised regarding his sample. This negative relationship between education and fertility comes up in Population Reference Bureau, "Transitions in World Population," Population Bulletin 59(1) (March 2004), pp. 140, which, in turn, draws in part on P. Morgan, "Is Low Fertility a Twenty-first Century Demographic Crisis?," Demography 40(4) (2003), pp. 589603, which is essentially a reprint of the presidential address to the Population Association of America in 2003. This is pretty much standard demography until the author nears the end and attempts to answer the question posed in his title. We then read this: "An African American colleague recently questioned my research agenda: 'So you're studying the disappearance of white folks.' I was taken aback; this is not how I prefer to characterize my work" (p. 600), Morgan grants the African American "his point." But it is more than a point; it is, as he said before, an agenda. And the African American is right: Morgan is studying the "disappearance of white folks."
26. G. Caldwell, op. cit.
27. Brewer (quoted in The Occidental Quarterly 2[4] [2002/2003], in L. Andrews, "Review of Ethnic Conflicts Explained by Ethnic Nepotism, by Tatu Vanhanen" at http//theoccidentalquarterly.com/vol2no4/lra-vanhanen.html [22 April 2004]) presents another theory: "Membership in the majority group of whites is too inclusive an identity to stimulate feelings of belonging" (originally from M. Brewer, "The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 17[5] [October 1991], pp. 475482). The author is obviously trying to develop a theory that applies to all majority groups; she is trying to develop a theory that is universally applicable. But it doesn't apply to the Han Chinese, who make up 91% of China's population (see N. Riley, "China's Population: New Trends and Challenges," Population Bulletin 59 2] [June 2004], pp. 136), a higher percentage of China's population than the white percentage in the U.S. The Han Chinese are intensely racially self-aware (see, for an excellent discussion of this, F. Dikotter, "Throw Away Babies," Times Literary Supplement, January 12, 1996, pp. 45; also J. Kuhn, "Chinese People's Republic Is Unfair to Its Short People," New York Times, May 21, 2004, p. A13, and J. Yardley, "Letter from Asia: Racial 'Handicaps' and a Great Sprint Forward," New York Times, September 8, 2004, p. A4). They are gradually displacing the minorities within the territory of China, particularly the Uigurs of Xinjiang and the Tibetans, both of whom are quite restive. The Chuangs and Mongols, two other important minorities in China, are quiescent and have been ignored so far.
28. For a more recent essay by Raspail, see his "La patrie trahie par la Rιpublique," Le Figaro, June 17, 2004, translated in The Social Contract 14(4) (Summer 2004), pp. 287288, "Fatherland Betrayed by the Republic."
29. R. Cattell, A New Morality from Science: Beyondism (New York: Pergamon, 1972).
30. See J. Unwin, Sex and Culture (London: Oxford University Press, 1934. Unwin argues that absolute monogamy is necessary for urban civilization. He writes, explicitly using a psychoanalytic model, that absolute monogamy is the only familial institution so far observed capable of reducing sexual opportunity to the point where sufficient energy is released to build a civilization. More recently, David Friedman, in his book, A Mind of Its Own: A Cultural History of the Penis (London: Hale, 2004), suggests that civilization depends on sublimation.
31. See W. McNeil, Plagues and Peoples (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1976), especially pp. 52 ff.
32. I am indebted to Dr. John Tanton for suggesting the ideas adumbrated in this paragraph. Of course, he bears no responsibility for the exposition here.