The left is reviling Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington for his discussions of affirmative action, multiculturalism, bilingual education, and immigration in Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity and branding him a racist, while the right is hailing him for confronting these things. In the uproar, Huntington’s discussions of ethnicity and race have gone unnoticed, a deficiency the present effort seeks to redress.
From a conservative perspective, Who Are We? is bad news. For one thing, it reveals that the conservative strategy of outreach to liberal intellectuals has failed. Far more seriously, although Huntington’s treatments of immigration, multiculturalism, and elites are welcome, Who Are We? is insidious, subversive, and profoundly evil. Finally, its reception witnesses bleakly for the mainstream right’s fatuity and cowardice on what really matters.
Huntington sees our national identity threatened by mass immigration; multiculturalism; a trend of Hispanicization due to the large, growing, and mostly immigrant Hispanic population; and the denationalization of America’s elites. America has four possible futures, he maintains. We could become a “creedal nation” united only by commitment to a set of political principles, the liberal democratic Creed of democracy, individual rights and liberties, rule of law, and so on, first formulated by Jefferson. This assumes that “a nation can be based on only a political contract among individuals lacking any other commonality.” But Huntington warns that a “creedal nation” might become a loose collection of diverse groups, apt to disintegrate without a central authority to hold it together. Another possibility is that the Spanish-speaking Hispanic presence could create a bilingual, bicultural America like Canada, a possibility which, judging from the attention he gives it, disturbs Huntington greatly. Third, America’s demographic and political transformation could prompt whites “to revive the discarded and discredited racial and ethnic concepts of American identity and to create an America that would exclude, expel or suppress” people of other races, cultures, or ethnicities. While this is a highly probable reaction by a majority group that feels threatened, “It could produce a racially intolerant country with high levels of intergroup conflict.” Obviously not what Huntington wants. Finally—and what he apparently does want—Americans of all races and ethnicities “could attempt to reinvigorate their core culture,” by recommitting to a religious, mostly Christian, and English-speaking America which accepts “Anglo-Protestant values” and the Jeffersonian Creed.1
Huntington demolishes the half-truths that America is “a nation of immigrants” and that our identity is grounded solely in “a set of political principles, the American Creed.” He makes a good case that “Anglo-Protestant culture,” not political propositions, is the true core of American identity. America would not be what she is, he avers, had she been settled by anybody other than English Protestants. As he correctly observes, historically, assimilation meant embracing Anglo-Protestant culture, starting with learning English. “Throughout American history, people who were not white Anglo-Saxon Protestants have become Americans by adopting America’s Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture and political values.”2
He bluntly calls immigration “the greatest threat” to America’s “societal security”—its ability to preserve its essential nature and identity under changing and adverse conditions. The real issue, he maintains, is immigration without assimilation. Formerly, immigrants assimilated, because they came from many nations and dispersed spatially after arrival; because most immigrants had cultures similar to or compatible with ours; because they wanted to Americanize; because immigration had fluctuating levels and long pauses allowing assimilation of immigrants already here; and because America insisted upon their Americanization and worked hard to Americanize them. Now, however, most immigrants are from cultures radically dissimilar to ours. Many are not committed to Americanizing, and need not Americanize; they can retain dual identity and even dual citizenship. Immigration is persistently high, hindering assimilation. Moreover, many in the elite do not want assimilation, and public policies such as bilingual education hinder it.
Rightly, Huntington observes that Mexican immigration is unique in that it comes from an adjacent country across a long, porous border; is persistently high; is often illegal; is concentrated in the formerly Mexican Southwest; and that Mexicans lag behind other immigrants in such important aspects of assimilation as learning English, educational attainment, occupation and income, naturalization, intermarriage with the indigenous population, and sense of identity with America. He raises the possibility that the Southwest will become Hispanized like Cuban-dominated Miami, culturally and socially amalgamated with Mexico, and that its dominant Hispanic majority will neither want nor need to assimilate.
Multiculturalism, which Huntington rightly calls “anti-European civilization” and “basically an anti-Western ideology,”3 further hinders assimilation and risks creating an America of subnational groups committed to different political creeds. Much of America’s identity crisis, he rightly observes, is the work of “denationalized” academic, business, professional, and political elites—hostile to the very idea of the nation, embracing a universalist morality, seeing themselves as citizens of the world, and loyal to transnational organizations such as multinational corporations. The elites enacted the 1965 Immigration Act, which opened America to mass non-European immigration, and worked to deliberately deconstruct America through affirmative action and other racial preferences, bilingual education, abandonment of Americanization, and so on.
Welcome though Huntington's unmasking of the anti-American elite is, this is not news to us on the hard right. A seminal treatment of liberalism’s role in Western decline is James Burnham’s Suicide of the West (1964), still valuable for its illuminating treatment of liberal guilt, and which Huntington never mentions. Liberal intellectuals’ and opinion leaders’ hostility to America was abundantly documented in Paul Hollander's Anti-Americanism (1992)—which, incredibly, Huntington never cites either. Political correctness has received searching criticisms, e.g., Roger Kimball’s Tenured Radicals (1990) and Charles J. Sykes’s The Hollow Men (1990), two other works Huntington overlooks. The vast discrepancy between the elite’s agenda and the desires of the American people, the elite’s callous indifference to the people’s wishes, the globalist and business leadership’s obsessive economism, and the harmful effects of the elite’s policies were all spelled out compactly and forcefully by Louis T. March and Brent Nelson’s The Great Betrayal: The Elite’s War on Middle America (1995). Other useful, and also overlooked, treatments of these phenomena are Christopher Lasch’s The Truest and Only Heaven (1991) and The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy (1995), Samuel Francis’s Revolution from the Middle (1997), and Patrick Buchanan’s The Great Betrayal (1998).
Likewise, most of Huntington’s facts and arguments about multiculturalism and immigration have already been presented more compellingly elsewhere. Multiculturalism and multiculturalist public policies have received penetrating criticism at Paul Gottfried’s scholarly hands in Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt (2002). Brent Nelson’s compact, unsung classic, America Balkanized: Immigration's Challenge to Government (1994), deals with many of Huntington’s topics, such as Mexican immigration and the Hispanicization of Miami and the Southwest, with greater force, penetration, and perception. Much of Huntington’s background information on immigration, and many of the concerns he raises, appeared already in Peter Brimelow’s Alien Nation (1995). Lawrence Auster’s The Path to National Suicide (1990) shows that America’s culture and institutions have an Anglo-Saxon core. Auster’s Huddled Clichés (1997) debunks many specious arguments for immigration, including the “nation of immigrants” and “creedal nation” myths, while his Erasing America: The Politics of the Borderless Nation (2003) tackles immigration, multiculturalism, and their threats to America’s survival. Many of Huntington’s immigration concerns were ably raised in Louis T. March’s Immigration and the End of Self-Government (1999). The special, dangerous characteristics of Mexican immigration and its threat to America were well covered by Pat Buchanan’s The Death of the West (2002). Many of these works speculated that the Southwest could become Hispanized like Miami and thereby resemble Quebec. Samuel Francis’s America Extinguished (2003) valuably examines assimilation in general and the non-assimilation of Hispanics in particular, and the crucial importance of language for assimilation.
Incredibly, Huntington cites none of this literature. His 602 reference notes do not mention any conservative critics of multiculturalism, and aside from a few works by the Center for Immigration Studies and a couple of pieces in The Social Contract, omit the large immigration restrictionist literature. This performance reveals the degree to which Establishment intellectuals have chosen to ignore serious conservative writing. One reason why conservative critiques of the century-long trend of American history and policy have had so little impact, Who Are We? makes clear, is that the Establishment has simply brushed them off. One would think that a scholar of Huntington’s caliber venturing to write on immigration’s threat to our identity would have made it his business to familiarize himself with the restrictionist literature. Yet doing so apparently never crossed his mind. And if a self-proclaimed conservative is so ignorant of conservative critiques of immigration, unabashed liberals must surely be even more so. Conservatives have, in William F. Buckley’s phrase, stood “athwart history, yelling ‘Stop,’” but the message didn’t get through—because the liberal and economic elite driving the steamroller did not want to hear it and was not going to listen. As Huntington shows, it still doesn’t and still won’t.
Indeed, one of the deeper significances of Huntington’s blank ignorance of conservative critiques of multiculturalism, immigration, and the immigration myths is its inadvertent revelation that post–World War II mainstream conservatism’s strategy of reaching out to and converting liberal intellectuals simply has not worked, and was probably quixotic all along. Conservative historian George H. Nash reveals that in preparing to launch National Review, Buckley
forcefully rejected what he called “the popular and cliché-ridden appeal to the ‘grass-roots’” and strove instead to establish a journal which would reach intellectuals. Not all conservatives agreed with this approach, but the young editor-to-be was firm. It was the intellectuals, after all, “who have midwived and implemented the revolution. We have got to have allies among the intellectuals, and we propose to renovate conservatism and see if we can’t win some of them around.”4
Well, Mr. Buckley, you can’t win them around if they won’t read you.
From Huntington’s own evidence, the American people are far more conservative, patriotic, and religious than the elites. Moreover, as he also shows, substantial majorities of Americans have consistently opposed America’s elite-imposed deconstruction, and have supported such measures as pro-English language ballot initiatives, immigration control, and denying welfare to illegal aliens.5 It stands to reason that conservatism's natural audience is the people, not the elites. All too clearly, then, Buckley’s strategy is the exact opposite of what National Review, and conservatism in general, should have done: address the people, educate them about America’s perils, and rouse them to take their country back.
And it is telling that conservatives who try to do just that, such as Pat Buchanan and Sam Francis, are relentlessly pilloried by the “respectable,” “responsible” right. One gets an uncanny impression that mainstream conservatives are not only so intimidated by liberals that they define triumph as winning liberals’ approval (thereby attaining power and lucre for themselves), but are also terrified of the people and of what they might do if they ever became aroused.
Moreover, genuine conservatives—those wishing to conserve America’s identity as an essentially European nation with an essentially British, or at least European, civilization and culture—who think Huntington is a kindred spirit are sadly mistaken. Although in an interview he said “I view myself as a conservative,”6 Who Are We? and his subsequent pronouncements prove that Huntington is no conservative in the foregoing sense.
For one thing, Huntington is no restrictionist. Perhaps to appease his rabid immigrationist critics, he also stated in the same interview that “basically, immigration is good,” that in 1965, “I think very happily, we opened up, changed those [immigration] laws,” and that “I want to make it clear that I’m not opposed to immigration per se. I’m in favor of immigration... But it has to be immigration with assimilation.”7 His treatment of immigration has, too, a naïve and unserious quality. While he bemoans mass, especially illegal, Hispanic immigration and the lack of assimilation, and observes that past immigration lulls facilitated immigration, it never occurs to him to draw the obvious conclusion that an immigration moratorium and rigorous elimination of illegal immigration are crucial to assimilation, much less to recommend these measures. Can a scholar of Huntington’s stature possibly be this simpleminded?
Worse yet, Who Are We? is lethally flawed by Huntington’s frantic desire to separate nationality and culture from ethnicity and race. He makes this desire clear early on. He is arguing, his foreword declares,
for the importance of Anglo-Protestant culture, not Anglo-Protestant people. I believe one of the greatest achievements, perhaps the greatest achievement, of America is the extent to which it has eliminated the racial and ethnic components that historically were central to its identity and has become a multiethnic, multiracial society in which individuals are to be judged on their merits. That has happened, I believe, because of the commitment successive generations of Americans have had to the Anglo-Protestant culture and the Creed of the founding settlers. If that commitment is sustained, America will still be America long after the WASPish descendants of its founders have become a small and uninfluential minority. That is the America I know and love. It is also, as the evidence in these pages demonstrates, the America most Americans love and want.8
Deborah Solomon’s interview of Huntington in the New York Times Magazine made it even clearer. While Solomon was appallingly unprofessional, rude, and childish, making such remarks as “I hope you’re not one of those Mayflower snobs” and “Did you grow up in a WASP-y mansion in Connecticut with servants?” she nevertheless brought out Huntington’s almost desperate flight from messy, intractable flesh-and-blood realities into a safe haven of abstractions:
SOLOMON: Do you think there is any truth to the stereotypical view of WASPs as emotionally cold people?
HUNTINGTON: Wait a minute. You’re talking about people. I am not talking about people. I am talking about ideas and practices.
SOLOMON: What do you say to the fact that about 10 percent of the U.S. soldiers serving in Iraq are Hispanic?
HUNTINGTON: Again you are talking about people.
SOLOMON: What else is there besides people?
HUNTINGTON: There is what people believe, what their assumptions are. I am concerned about the degree to which people—whatever their color—believe in the American creed and accept American values.9
Oddly enough, Who Are We? never defines “nation,” although surely it would be appropriate in a book devoted to national identity. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1951) gives the etymology of “nation” as follows: from the Old French nacion, which came from the Latin natio, nation, race, which in turn came from natus, the past participle of nasci, to be born. A nation, then—as conservative critics of immigration such as Thomas Fleming, Nelson, and Brimelow have rightly observed—is essentially an extended family, meaning it has a common, or at least dominant, ethnic stock.10
The same dictionary defines “nation” as
1. A people connected by supposed [sic] ties of blood generally manifested by community of language, religion, customs, etc. 2. Any aggregation of people having like institutions and customs and a sense of social homogeneity and mutual interest. 3. The body of inhabitants of a country united under a single independent government; a state.
The first, and original, definition is rooted in lived realities of flesh and blood and the common experience, language, culture, folkways, and world view of a people, whereas the other two are in order of increasing abstraction from these realities; by the time we reach the third definition, a nation's inhabitants have nothing in common but geographic location and their government. Whether Huntington uses nation in the second or third sense is not clear; what is clear is that he does not mean it in the first sense.
His desire to sever nationhood and culture from ethnicity also emerges in his treatment of the Soviet Union. With the Cold War over, he notes, the Soviets no longer had an enemy; and without it, the Soviet Union “quickly dissolved into sixteen states, each with its own national identity defined largely by culture and history.”11 The last statement is a crass evasion of the truth that these states were in fact “largely defined” by ethnicity: Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Estonian, Georgian, Latvian, and so on. It was obviously ethnicity that gave these nations their identity, and was the main root of their mutual antagonisms. Where did their distinct cultures come from, if not their ethnicities? What were their histories, if not the stories of their peoples’ existence?
Huntington’s project of downplaying ethnicity also drives his tendentious concept of “culture.” For him culture is not the artistic expression of a people at a given stage of their civilization and history, but, as we saw, a matter of ideas, beliefs, and institutions. Key elements of “Anglo-Saxon culture” include “the English language; Christianity; religious commitment; English concepts of the rule of law, the responsibility of rules, and the rights of individuals,” as well as the dissenting Protestant values of industry (which he stresses), individualism, and the duty to create a sort of heaven on earth.12 Since anybody can subscribe to a belief or idea or participate in an institution, Huntington’s definition cuts culture loose from all of its roots in ethnicity save one: language.
For genuine conservative critics of immigration such as Brimelow, Nelson, Fleming, Francis, and Auster, “nation” and “culture” are not the abstractions they are for Huntington, but are grounded in ethnicity. Huntington and the conservative restrictionists are literally not speaking the same language.
One huge problem is that Huntington’s abstract approach is impossible to square with his own historical account. He asserts that what is important is “Anglo-Protestant culture, not Anglo-Protestant people.” Yet he argues that if America had not been settled by British Protestants, “It would not be America; it would be Quebec, Mexico, or Brazil,”13 which is necessarily an admission that Anglo-Protestant people are in fact crucially important to our identity. Furthermore, he notes Campbell Gibson’s finding that 49 percent of America's 1990 population was descended from the 1790 colonial and black populations—which obviously implies that for most of America’s history, the lion’s share of her population was Anglo-Protestant. Surely this fact is of decisive importance for our national identity. Not only culture in the usual sense but culture in Huntington’s special sense is in fact grounded in ethnicity; just how would America have created an Anglo-Protestant culture without an overwhelmingly Anglo-Protestant population?
And just how would the Americanization of immigrants—their assimilation of Anglo-Protestant culture—have taken place without an overwhelmingly Anglo-Protestant population living that culture and thereby providing a model for immigrants to emulate; enveloping immigrants in that culture; creating, operating, and manning the institutions that promoted Americanization; and sufficiently aware and proud of its Anglo-Protestant identity to deem it worth preserving and to insist on immigrants’ conformity to its ways? Had Anglo-Protestants been only a slim majority of the population and not controlled our institutions, the Anglo-Protestant culture Huntington stresses could not possibly have become, and remained, central to America’s identity. And without a critical mass of Anglo-Protestant people, America could not have retained its essential identity in the face of the pre-1924 waves of immigration.
Furthermore, in discussing the fragility of the “Creed” of political beliefs, Huntington states that the Creed itself “was the product of people with a distinct Anglo-Protestant culture” even though “other peoples” embraced parts of it. Moreover, “‘We the people of the United States’ had to exist with a common ethnicity [sic!], race [sic!!], culture, language, and religion before we could ‘ordain and establish this Constitution of the United States of America.’” Which of course means that white, Anglo-Protestant people were decisively important after all! He goes on to warn that a multicultural America will eventually become a multicreedal one, “with groups with different cultures espousing distinctive political values and principles rooted in their particular cultures.”14
But where does Huntington think different cultures and political creeds come from, if not different races and ethnic groups? Where else, indeed, could they come from? These things are not plucked out of thin air. Moreover, if the Anglo-Protestant or at least European share of the population were an overwhelming majority of the population, the multicultural-multicreedal problem he raises simply could not arise; even if there were some people who believed in, say, an absolute monarchy or rule by nepotism and graft rather than the rule of law, there would not be enough of them to matter. Huntington’s treatment of ethnicity, then, is hopelessly muddled and contradictory, driven by the clash between his acknowledgment of historical realities and his flight from what they imply.
A second grave problem is that Huntington’s sense of “culture” also renders his demolition of the “creedal nation” myth illusory and meretricious. Given his definition of “Anglo-Protestant culture,” it emerges immediately that “the Creed,” consisting of democracy, equality, rights and liberties, individualism, property and the rule of law, is merely a subset of “Anglo-Protestant culture,” and that the latter is merely “the Creed” plus the English language, Protestant Christianity, and a tendency to workaholism. Anybody can become an American, immigrationists claim, by assenting to a set of “propositions." Huntington’s only dissent from this is that becoming an American also requires learning English, being somewhat individualistic, perhaps being religious, and working hard. Thanks to his preference for dwelling in a world of abstractions, he and the immigrationists are not so far apart after all.
Huntington’s treatment of race is even worse, and here the evil hidden agenda of Who Are We? emerges.
If anything, Huntington is even more anxious to de-emphasize race than he is to de-emphasize ethnicity. In an interview he revealed himself cheerfully unconcerned by predictions that white Americans will be a minority by 2050:
LAMB: You suggested by some year in middle 2000s that this country—whites will be in the minority.
HUNTINGTON: Well, I don’t suggest it. The census projections say that by the year 2050, non-Hispanic whites will be about 50 percent of the population.
LAMB: And is there anything wrong with that?
HUNTINGTON: No. I have nothing against the changing racial makeup of the country. I have no concern about people’s color. I do have concerns about their values and culture and commitment and those sorts of things. But whether they’re black, brown, white, or whatever, yellow, seems to me doesn’t make any difference and shouldn’t make any difference.15
Perhaps it shouldn’t, but for a lot of people it does, and many, probably most, of them are nonwhites, immigrants, or both. Huntington here displays a weakness of intellectuals verging on the psychopathology called denial, a weakness aptly described by military historian Correlli Barnett: a tendency “to feel that once something has been demonstrated to be absurd or self-destructive it is as good as written off. However, while you may rightly tell a drunkard that drink will kill him if he does not give it up, how do you stop him drinking?”16 While intellectuals like Huntington may tell everybody that race doesn’t and shouldn’t make any difference, how do they get the National Council of La Raza, MEChA, and other such nonwhite racist groups to stop thinking and acting as if it does? And if these groups are oblivious to such exhortations (and they are), then the central conservative virtue of prudence dictates that one should have something against America’s changing racial makeup.
Given Huntington’s own correct observations that “In the long run...numbers are power, particularly in a multicultural society, a political democracy, and a consumer economy” and that “the large and increasing absolute numbers of Mexicans reduce the incentives for cultural assimilation,”17 his profession of unconcern for America’s changing racial makeup is disingenuous, duplicitous, a sorry effort at appeasement, or incredibly, frighteningly naïve.
He asserts early in Who Are We? that “Identities are, overwhelmingly, constructed.” Apart from a few characteristics like age, ancestry, and gender, one may define one’s identity as one likes. Although we inherit race and ethnicity, “these can be redefined or rejected, and the meaning and applicability of a term like ‘race’ changes over time.”18 These claims place Huntington squarely in impious liberal modernity, which takes little or nothing as given, and sees reality as substantially, if not infinitely, malleable.
Much later, in his discussion of race and ethnicity, these conceptual bombs suddenly explode. Ethnic identities among whites are disappearing due to forces such as ethnic intermarriage, he observes. Instead, most whites now see themselves simply as whites, rather than Irish, German, and so on. “This could have serious implications for American society,” he warns darkly. Identity, he says, requires an other, in contrast to whom it understands itself, and so, unsurprisingly, in some situations whites of different ethnic backgrounds assert a white identity and cooperate against non-whites. “There is, however, another possibility that is the most inclusive of all. White Americans could forgo subnational, communal identities and simply think of themselves as Americans.”19
Two paragraphs later he returns to this topic and warns that if whites see themselves as whites, it can have ominous consequences:
The identity white Americans choose to replace their fading ethnic identities has profound implications for America’s future. If they define themselves primarily as Euro-American or Anglo in response to a perceived Hispanic challenge, the cultural divide in America will be formalized. If they think of themselves primarily as white in opposition to blacks and others, the historic racial fault line will be reinvigorated. On the other hand, national identity and national unity will be strengthened if white Americans echo Ward Connerly and conclude that their mixed ancestries make them “All American.”20
In other words, Huntington maintains that the proper response by white Americans to pressure from Hispanics—whose challenge, as his own evidence makes clear, is not “perceived,” but quite real—and blacks, both of whom are increasingly blatant in their antiwhite racism, is to simply forget their race.
Significantly, Huntington makes no corresponding suggestion that blacks, Asians, or the Hispanics, whose rising numbers and resistance to assimilation bother him so much, forget their racial identity and consciousness, even though these phenomena are clearly much stronger, more pervasive, and more dangerous—more likely to translate into militancy, even violence—among them than among whites. Whites have, for example, nothing to compare with the array of militant, race-conscious minority advocacy groups: NAACP, CORE, Nation of Islam, MEChA, MALDEF, LULAC, National Council of La Raza, and so on. The self-forgetting is to be done by one race only, the one already least racially conscious.
So Huntington is advocating white unilateral disarmament in the face of rising antiwhite racism and hostility. A scholar of his attainments cannot fail to know that unilateral disarmament in the presence of rising aggression is a formula for disaster, and that it proved itself so for Britain and France between the world wars. Why then does he advocate it for American whites?
Huntington then turns to race. While physical differences between races exist, he acknowledges, people classify each other by race because they deem it important, and therefore “race is a social construction as well as a physical reality.” Likewise, he asserts that “Race may also be a political construction.” Why? Because “Governments classify people into different racial categories” and allocate advantages and disadvantages on that basis.21 That race is a social and political construct is, of course, a core dogma of political correctness. So much for Huntington the conservative.
Huntington’s argument is, to put it charitably, flimsy in the extreme. In a fatuously literal-minded sense, his claims that race is partly a social and political construct are true, but Huntington evades the obvious truth that these social and political classifications are themselves based on the reality of observable differences. Two simple examples make this clear. Dog owners and veterinarians classify dogs into collies, Labradors, beagles, and so on, too, but the mere act of writing different breed names on a sheet of paper does not make “collie,” “beagle,” and “Labrador” social “constructs.” Nobody in his right mind would take such a claim seriously. Similarly, a dog off-leash in Ann Arbor's Nichols Arboretum is liable to a fine, whereas a dog on a leash is not, but while “off-leash” is a government classification, it is not a political “construct” concocted out of whole cloth, it is a name for an observable fact. It is only because intellectual honesty, critical judgment, and standards of argument have been largely destroyed in America thanks to Deweyite education and relentless liberal race-baiting that Huntington could write such nonsense and get by with it.
An observation by Ellsworth Toohey, the villain of Ayn Rand’s novel The Fountainhead, is apt here: “But there’s always a purpose in nonsense. Don’t bother to examine a folly—ask yourself only what it accomplishes.” What the folly of race as “construct” accomplishes is to enable its author to assert (as liberals invariably proceed to do) that race does not matter, which in turn is almost invariably the entering wedge for promoting intermarriage and miscegenation.
Sure enough, with this folly behind him, Huntington then points out that race in America is slowly blurring, both biologically through intermarriage and “symbolically and attitudinally” through greater acceptance of individual multiracialism. “Americans approve of their country moving from a multiracial society of racial groups to a nonracial society of multiracial individuals.” After adding that races will still exist, “but not necessarily to the same degree or with the same significance” as in the past, he reports that intermarriage is “blurring the lines between the races. Much more importantly, race and racial distinctions are losing significance in people’s thinking.” There follow results from opinion polls purporting to prove that approval or at least acceptance of race mixing is rising dramatically.22
Had Huntington merely said that some Americans approve of this transformation, or many, or even, as the polls he cites suggest, a majority, that would be unobjectionable. As it stands, however, “Americans approve of their country moving from a multiracial society of racial groups to a nonracial society of multiracial individuals” is simply counterfactual. Huntington cites a 2001 Harvard/Kaiser Foundation/Washington Post poll which indicates that fifty-three percent of whites believed that it made no difference whether one married within or outside one’s race.23 What he does not say is that this implies that to forty-seven percent of whites, it does. On his own evidence, then, only a wafer-thin majority of whites accepts interracial marriage. Privately (and safely off the record in the land of free speech), many whites disapprove of it. Hostility to mixing is widespread among African-American women, who quite understandably resent white women poaching on the pool of eligible black bachelors. Many Asian parents disapprove of their children dating and marrying whites. This too is quite understandable, as intermarriage dilutes the Asianness of their families—and family identity and solidarity are much more important to Asians than to the far more individualist whites. Huntington's sweeping “Americans approve,” then, is not what a scrupulous scholar mindful of the facts would write. It looks suspiciously as if it were written with promotional intent.
This suspicion is strengthened when Huntington concludes his survey of poll results thus: “As one professor of sociology commented, ‘interracial marriages and their approval is [sic] increasing terribly fast. If you have hang-ups about interracial marriage, get over it. The train’s left the station.’” The sociologist’s first sentence is unobjectionable, a straight statement of fact. The next two are a blatant attempt to browbeat people with “hang-ups about interracial marriage” by depicting their disapproval as an exercise in futility. By quoting all three, with an affirming “as” placed before, Huntington passes from reporting to advocacy—an advocacy, moreover, in an unmistakably overweening, triumphalist tone. (Don’t like it? Tough! The big locomotive’s rolling, the train’s left the station!) Likewise, writing on the change of attitudes about race mixing, Huntington reports on the cover of Time’s special issue on “The New Face of America,” “which shows a highly attractive [sic] young woman, computer-generated from many races, and hailed by Time as the ‘new face’ of America in the twenty-first century.”24 Clearly, Huntington is trying to foist miscegenation on his readers by depicting it as “attractive” and as the irresistible wave of the future.
He ends his section on the blurring and fading of race as follows:
If the trends toward multiracialism continue, they will at some point, as Joel Perlmann and Roger Waldinger say, make government efforts to classify people by race “quaintly passé.” When it happens, the removal of race from census forms will signal a dramatic step toward the creation of a comprehensive American national identity. At present, race still matters in America, but in more and more segments of national life, it matters less and less, except for those who view its declining salience as a threat to the place of whites in America.25
In other words, for Huntington the biological obliteration of separate races, especially whites, is a good thing, essential for creating a stronger American national identity. Huntington thinks America would be better off without white people (and, for that matter, without black, yellow, red, and brown people). Although he does not say it explicitly, his prescription is clear. Whites should forget their identity as whites and not resist rising pressure from Hispanics and blacks, cheerfully submit to dispossession, and embrace and celebrate their gradual biological obliteration through intermarriage and miscegenation. The self-proclaimed conservative Huntington ends up where liberals always end up: exhorting whites to commit race suicide to prove what nice people they are and to promote liberal desiderata such as social harmony—in this case, national unity and identity.
Huntington’s real agenda is not traditional American patriotism, in which subnational identities (e.g., race, ethnicity, state) were allowed to coexist with national identity, but radical social reconstruction to obliterate subnational identities which are deemed undesirable, even if they don’t necessarily undermine patriotism or good citizenship (plenty of whites proudly conscious of their whiteness fought America's wars, for example). For all his purported conservatism, Huntington is eerily like the Jacobins, who sought to eradicate subnational identities such as the family, claiming that French children belonged to la patrie; like Mussolini with his slogan “Everything within the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state” (indeed, one need merely substitute “national identity” for “the state” to arrive at Huntington's position); like the Nazis proclaiming Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer! and erasing subnational identities and loyalties to, for example, Germany’s historic states; and like the Soviets, who strove to squelch the ethnic loyalties of the Soviet Union’s non-Russian nationalities. A discerning reading, then, reveals Huntington as no conservative at all, but yet another radically renovating liberal, trying to destroy the organic loyalties and identities of human nature for the sake of an abstraction. Indeed, in hailing race mixing as helping create “a comprehensive American national identity,” Huntington is not far from Ben Wattenberg with his paeans to race mixing as creating “the first universal nation.” And if identities are “overwhelmingly constructed,” and race is merely a social and political “construct,” why not?
Question: If Huntington deems race unimportant, then why can’t he leave the subjects of race and white identity alone, why is he promoting white self-forgetting and miscegenation, and why isn’t he telling the unabashedly race-conscious nonwhites—who need to hear this message far more than whites do—that race “doesn’t make any difference and shouldn’t make any difference”?
As for Huntington’s claim that race “matters less and less” in more and more aspects of existence, except among aggrieved whites, this is a howling falsehood. It is impossible to square with his own extensive presentation of affirmative action, multiculturalism, and other race-conscious policies. Race has never mattered more in America—and fixation with race is definitely not confined, as he claims, to whites who feel threatened. On the contrary, liberals have been obsessed with race for almost half a century, and race increasingly obtrudes in public policy. Racist antiwhite propaganda is standard fare in much of American “education,” for the obvious purposes of inciting militancy among nonwhite pupils and students and instilling racial guilt in white ones, breaking their will to resist their dispossession and obliteration, and even leading them to actively will it. Many colleges and universities now have mandatory white-demonizing courses on racism. Antiwhite racists have never been more aggressive, and their hatred is rising to a screeching crescendo; witness Leonard Jeffries and Noel “race traitor” Ignatiev. These are easily verified facts which Huntington cannot fail to know. His intellectual dishonesty here is breathtaking.
Next Huntington raises the possibility of a backlash of “white nativism.” To be fair, he uses “nativism” in a neutral, rather than pejorative, sense to mean intense opposition to internal minorities because they are foreign, seen as not really part of true American society, or seen as becoming a majority. He also argues that white nativists “should not be confused with extremist fringe groups,” such as the militias or “hate groups,” and that they are, rather, reacting to “the new realities of American society.” His efforts at fairness have their limits, however; Huntington does not cite any white nationalist writings, so as to let nationalists state their case, but he does quote their leftist foe Carol Swain.26
“It would, indeed, be extraordinary and possibly unprecedented in human history,” he concedes, if America’s “profound demographic changes” did not generate some kind of response among whites, and that the “actual and prospective continuing loss in power, status, and numbers” by any group “almost always leads to efforts by that group to stop or reverse those losses.”27 In other words, Huntington deems “white nativism” not at all unreasonable, but rather the sort of thing human nature’s core instinct of self-preservation would lead one to expect—yet he thinks whites should make a suicidal effort to transcend human nature and its deepest instinctual drive, and abolish themselves anyway! Like so many white liberals, Huntington seems possessed by a racial death wish, and seeks to inculcate it in his white readers.
Just exactly what is wrong with white nativism as he defines it, especially since he (properly) takes pains to distinguish it from crackpot racial hate? Huntington’s only answer is that it creates the possibility of “intensified racial conflict” and a more intolerant, exclusionist America.28 This may not be politically correct, but that’s not the worst of it. Brent Nelson spelled out the real problem with a clarity and forthrightness missing in Huntington: “When... European Americans begin to think of themselves as such and demand ethnically conscious European American leaders, then America will have become America Balkanized, a nation without Americans, just as Yugoslavia, in the early 1990s, became a nation without Yugoslavs: i.e., no longer a viable nation.”29
Nelson went on to argue that racial amalgamation along Brazilian lines—i.e., Huntington’s prescription—is an illusory cure. Brazil is in fact a racially stratified society shot through with racism, race obsessions, and conflict. He concluded that the only sound course, the only way to avert Balkanization, is rigorous immigration control.30
Nelson, not Huntington, has the right answer. If bilingualism, multiculturalism, immigration, and race-conscious policies such as affirmative action are the real causes of America’s identity crisis, then reason and common sense suggest that the cure is to remove them. Yet Huntington advocates instead a solution not suggested by the problem: white self-immolation. Why?
One would think that someone who is so concerned with the threat to national identity and “societal security” from mass immigration without assimilation would argue strongly for an immigration moratorium, a vigorous policy of Americanization, or both. Yet Who Are We? does no such thing. Aside from recommitment to Anglo-Protestant culture, white race suicide is the only recommendation Huntington makes. We are entitled to conclude that for Samuel Huntington the dispossession and destruction of the white race is a higher priority than national preservation through immigration control.
All of this has sailed ten leagues over the heads of mainstream conservative commentators on Huntington. Every last one of them completely ignored the ghastly faults of Who Are We?
New York Times op-ed columnist David Brooks focused on Huntington’s claim that Latino immigrants are assimilating slowly if at all, and dissented, arguing that “the most persuasive evidence is against him.” Mexicans are so assimilating, Brooks retorted, although peasants take longer to do so than the educated. What’s more, Mexicans are making economic progress, “are in fact dispersing around the nation,” and have lifestyles pretty much like those of other Americans, albeit perhaps spending more on children’s clothes and less on electronics. Moreover, Brooks added, “Anglo” and “Protestant” really don’t describe “the mentality that binds us. Rather, “We are bound together because we Americans share a common conception of the future.” For us, history is about leaps of progress. Yes, Mexicans lag at school, but that's “in part because we’ve failed them. Our integration [sic] machinery is broken.” If we stop immigration, “you can kiss goodbye the new energy, new tastes and new strivers who want to lunge into the future. That’s the real threat to the American creed.” Brooks had nothing to say about Huntington’s treatment of race.31 Small wonder this insipid, vacuous castrato has a reputation as the “liberals’ favorite conservative.” There is nothing here that would offend a charter member of Americans for Democratic Action.
National Review editor Rich Lowry summarized Huntington’s points about assimilation of immigrants and multiculturalism’s threat to the Creed, the threat to American identity from the denationalized elites, and his worry about bifurcation of America thanks to Hispanic immigration. He concluded by lauding Huntington’s courage. While he did note (without comment) Huntington’s argument for the importance of Anglo-Protestant culture rather than Anglo-Protestant people, Lowry too said nothing at all about Huntington’s treatments of race and white nativism, or about his advocacy of white race suicide.32
The same pattern characterized the rest of mainstream conservative treatment of Huntington. After presenting Huntington’s critiques of the elites and multiculturalism and his discussion of the roles of the Creed and Anglo-Protestant culture in American identity, University of Virginia professor James Ceaser devoted most of his review essay in The Weekly Standard to discussing Huntington’s switch of emphasis. Ceaser observed that in The Politics of Disharmony (1981) Huntington had argued that the Creed is the basis of American national identity, but that in Who Are We? he was arguing the opposite, that our identity is grounded in Anglo-Protestant culture, not the Creed. While probing the possible reasons for Huntington’s changed perspective, Ceaser was silent about his treatment of race.33
James Nuechterlein’s review devoted itself mostly to simply recapitulating Huntington’s points on national identity, immigration, assimilation, America’s possible bifurcation, the elites, and America’s religiosity. Huntington’s discussions of race and white nativism were ignored. A senior fellow of the Institute on Religion and Public Life, Nuechterlein reserved his criticism for Huntington’s stress on the centrality of “Anglo” and “Protestant” to American identity. After all, many American Christians are Catholics, and they “are not simply quasi-Protestants” with “a thing for Mary and the Pope.”34
Lauding Huntington for “perhaps the definitive” survey of the future of the American nation-state, Hudson Institute senior fellow John Fonte focused on his debunking of the half-truths about America being a “creedal nation” and a “nation of immigrants,” and on his treatment of assimilation. Although Fonte noted Huntington’s welcoming of a multiethnic, multiracial society, he had nothing to say about it—or, for that matter, about Huntington’s discussions of race and white nativism.35
Neither did David Frum in his utterly clueless “Huntington’s America.” While conceding that Huntington’s warnings about multiculturalism, bilingualism, and the inadequacy of a political creed to hold a nation together have a point, Frum chided Huntington for not giving more attention to the causes of mass Mexican immigration and to American responses to it. America can’t ignore Mexico, Frum argued, and should do more to help Mexico’s economic development. If Mexicans can find opportunity in Mexico, they won’t need to seek it here.36
To his credit, John O’Sullivan, editor-in-chief of The National Interest, produced a serious and illuminating study of Huntington’s view of immigration and the hysterically hostile reaction by many leftists and immigrationists to it. O’Sullivan rightly faulted Huntington’s critics for ignoring evidence in his favor, misrepresenting him, and making vitriolic personal attacks. Arguing that Huntington had long ago articulated “the single best definition of conservatism: Namely, that it is the set of ideas that men adopt in defense of their social and political institutions when they come under fundamental attack,” O’Sullivan maintained that Huntington believes our national identity and its supporting institutions and traditions are under attack and that Who Are We? “is a conservative defense of them.” He seconded Huntington’s demolition of the “creedal nation” and “nation of immigrants” myths and his view of elites, and defended his claims that Anglo-Protestant culture is central to American identity and that assimilation has consisted of embracing that culture. O’Sullivan concluded by praising Huntington to the skies. “Who Are We? is worth ten divisions in the new American culture war about patriotism.” It has demystified the claims used to deconstruct America, revealed that “some conservatives and neoconservatives are unwitting accomplices in this demolition,” and revealed “a substantial anti-American intelligentsia” (hasn’t O’Sullivan read Hollander’s Anti-Americanism?). In doing the last, “Huntington has performed an important intellectual service.” Yet even O’Sullivan said nothing about Huntington’s utter failure to call for immigration control and assimilation, his profoundly liberal view of identity, race, and ethnicity as malleable “constructs,” his discussion of white nativism, and his recommendation of white race suicide.37
So apparently nobody in the conservative mainstream picked up on Huntington’s profoundly antiwhite treatment of race and white nativism. Their loud silence about all this is disquieting. Did these people and I read the same book? Since we can probably safely assume that these writers in fact read Huntington's book—in some manner, anyway—it is implausible that every last one of them failed to see and notice this aspect of Who Are We? So ignorance cannot explain it. What, then, is behind it?
One possibility is that Huntington’s seeming conservatism on immigration, multiculturalism, and the elites bamboozled some of them into suspending critical judgment about everything else he said. This confirms a disheartening syndrome among conservatives: a cluelessness and naïveté making them rush to embrace anybody who makes conservative noises about anything and ignore his faults. This is not implausible; it goes far to explain the popularity among conservatives of such flawed specimens as Dinesh D’Souza, Jack Kemp, and William F. Bennett.
In some cases, the silence may be due to sheer slapdash negligence and incompetence. Perhaps in their rush to get into print on the latest “hot topic” they gave Huntington only one hasty and superficial reading, thumbing through the index and skipping and skimming. Or perhaps many of them, being maleducated journalists or careerist adventurers rather than scholars, just simply aren’t capable of reading with close attentiveness, penetration, and discernment. This too is quite plausible; note that mainstream conservatives have been enthusiasts for the horridly incompetent Julian Simon, who was drubbed for his innumerable howlers by such genuine scholars as Herman Daly and Garrett Hardin.38
Another explanation is that mainstream conservatives simply do not see white obliteration as an issue or a problem. This quite likely fits neoconservatives, globalists, immigrationists such as John J. Miller, and tame, lapdog conservatives such as George F. Will, who actually look forward to it.39 Also, many mainstream conservatives are conservative on one or a few issues and liberal on everything else. A case in point is Catholic conservative columnist Maggie Gallagher, who fulminates regularly on abortion, marriage, and homosexuality but whose observations on identity and whiteness would have warmed the cockles of Huntington’s heart—and, for that matter, Noel Ignatiev’s. She regarded herself, she wrote, as an American, a Catholic, and, sometimes, an Irish-American, but added that “I hate the idea of being white.... I never think of myself as belonging to the ‘white race.’ Those who do, in my experience, are invariably second-raters seeking solace for their own failures. I can think of few things more degrading than being proud to be white.”40
Still another possible explanation is that most conservatives have carried William F. Buckley’s project of “renovating” conservatism so as to find favor with liberal intellectuals to the point of demolition. Mainstream conservatives have made their peace with virtually everything on the liberal agenda: fiat money, free trade (pushed by such liberals as Cordell Hull and Franklin Roosevelt), internationalist foreign policy, the welfare state, Social Security and Medicare, continually expanding federal government power, the civil rights movement, feminism, sexual liberation in the arts and conduct—and immigration. Some “conservatives” like Huntington may still whine that the trouble with immigration is that it isn’t accompanied by assimilation, but the liberalism and economism which dominate conservatism dilute “assimilation” to endorsing democracy and capitalism and becoming interchangeable with the indigenous species of economic insects. A sign of this voice-merging with liberalism is that the liberal Victor Davis Hanson, whose muddled and wrongheaded Mexifornia was similarly lauded in mainstream conservative circles last year, has become a fixture at National Review.
Finally, mainstream conservatives are probably terrified of confronting race and being crucified by the left for doing so. As Peter Brimelow observed, conservatives have made a “bland bargain” with the powerful liberal establishment. It works like this:
Conservatives are now somewhat more likely to be allowed into public debate than in the dark years of the 1950s. But they must still not say anything that impinges upon the truly sacred liberal taboos—above all, of course, anything that might be remotely connected with ethnicity or race.... Slaves naturally try to curry favor with their masters.... Other slaves can grow to love their chains. These are conservatives who have internalized the prohibitions under which they must operate.41
We are safe in saying that David Brooks and David Frum, at least, have made the “bland bargain.” (So, perhaps, has Huntington himself.) Brooks would not be a New York Times columnist if he had not, nor would Frum find ready markets for his work in such mainstream places as The Wall Street Journal. Perhaps some of the others were afraid of retaliation if they spoke up. The vials of leftist wrath poured out on Huntington’s head no doubt served as an object lesson about what would happen to them if they did.
The left’s treatment of Huntington has another message, if conservatives could only grasp it: Appeasement does not work, the “bland bargain” is futile. Huntington's racial views are liberal boilerplate, and presumably the PC and immigrationist witchfinders who read Who Are We? noted this. Yet this did not save him from vitriolic abuse at their hands. Leftists and liberals are conducting a reign of terror against conservatives, and under such circumstances, it’s one slip and you’re damned. Even a deviation as innocuous as Huntington’s on immigration suffices for persecution.
But whatever the explanation, what matters is that the mainstream right has in fact been silent about the profoundly antiwhite aspects of Who Are We? The effect is to whitewash Huntington and lull whites to sleep about how wicked his book really is. Anyone who relied solely on mainstream conservative comments regarding Who Are We? would have no idea that Huntington advocates white racial suicide. Indeed, one who read John O’Sullivan's spirited defense of him from his fanatical immigrationist and multiculturalist detractors would come away thinking that Huntington is a staunch conservative on immigration, multiculturalism, and the elites, and be inclined to welcome him as an ally in the terrible political struggle shaping up over race and immigration, when he is, in fact, very much a fifth columnist. Moreover, the left’s vituperation of Huntington has the unfortunate effect of making him look more conservative than he is, since many conservatives cannot get it through their heads that the victim of your enemy is not necessarily your friend.
The mainstream right’s utter failure to smoke out Huntington has still deeper and worse meanings. For one thing, it demonstrates that it has become impossible to have a fearless, intellectually honest discussion of immigration, identity, and race in the mainstream media. Adhering to the party line of political correctness is apparently the price of admission.
For another, it signifies that the conservative mainstream is as blind to reality as Neville Chamberlain was at Munich. The hideous truth staring us in the face is that the elite which runs this country is bent on the dispossession and biological obliteration of whites, and that this monstrous effort is itself but one facet of the most profound social reconstruction project in history: the destruction of all human distinctions except those between a globalist Huxleyan elite of World Controllers and their interchangeable, helpless slaves. The evidence is piling up rapidly. Yet the mainstream right can’t, won’t see it.
And even if it could, mainstream conservatism’s evasion of the ugly realities of Who Are We? reveals it as worse than useless as a means of resisting the dispossession and obliteration of European-Americans. Their performance proves definitively that we can look to the National Review/Weekly Standard stratum of “conservatism” for nothing. We are on our own.
1. Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), pp. 19–20.
2. Ibid., p. 61.
3. Ibid., p. 171.
4. George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945 (Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1996), pp. 134–135.
5. Huntington, Who Are We?, pp. 324–335.
6. “Huntington Interview,” June 13, 2004, transcript, p. 20, at www.booknotes.org.
7. Ibid., pp. 10, 11, 19.
8. Huntington, Who Are We?, p. xvii.
9. “Three Cheers for Assimilation: Questions for Samuel P. Huntington,” The New York Times Magazine, May 2, 2004, at www.nytimes.com.
10. See Thomas Fleming, “The Real American Dilemma,” Chronicles, March 1989, p. 9; Brent A. Nelson, America Balkanized: Immigration’s Challenge to Government (Monterey, VA: American Immigration Control Foundation, 1994), p. 80; Peter Brimelow, Alien Nation: Common Sense About America’s Immigration Disaster (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. xix, 203.
11. Huntington, Who Are We?, p. 259.
12. Ibid., p. xvi.
13. Ibid., p. 59.
14. Ibid., pp. 339, 340.
15. “Huntington Interview,” June 13, 2004, transcript, p. 13, at www.booknotes.org.
16. Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1972), p. 48.
17. Huntington, Who Are We?, p. 253.
18. Ibid., p. 23.
19. Ibid., pp. 301–302.
20. Ibid., pp. 302–303.
21. Ibid., p. 303.
22. Ibid., pp. 304–306.
23. Ibid., p. 306.
24. Ibid., pp. 306, 307.
25. Ibid., p. 309.
26. Ibid., pp. 310, 311, 313.
27. Ibid., pp. 310, 313.
28. Ibid., pp. 20, 315.
29. Nelson, America Balkanized, p. 70.
30. Ibid., pp. 98–99, 106.
31. David Brooks, “The Americano Dream,” New York Times, February 24, 2004, at www.nytimes.com.
32. Rich Lowry, “Huntington’s Warning,” National Review Online, April 28, 2004, at www.nationalreview.com.
33. James W. Ceaser, “O, My America: The Clash of Huntingtons,” The Weekly Standard, May 3, 2004, pp. 33–37.
34 James Nuechterlein, “Protestant Ethic,” Commentary, May 2004, pp. 63–65.
35. John Fonte, “Assimilation Nation,” National Review, May 31, 2004, pp. 40–41.
36. David Frum, “Huntington’s America,” National Review Online, July 6, 2004, at www.nationalreview.com.
37. John O’Sullivan, “Who Are We? Samuel Huntington’s new book forces a debate on immigration and American destiny,” The American Conservative, July 19, 2004, pp. 7–13.
38. It is painfully illuminating to contrast the shallow, ill-informed, credulous, and laudatory, sometimes gushingly enthusiastic reviews of Simon’s The Ultimate Resource (1981) in conservative and libertarian publications with the rigorous critical reviews and examinations by scholars knowledgeable in the fields on which Simon so breezily pontificated. For the former, J. Peter Vajk, “Missing Link in the Resource Equation,” Reason, December 1981, pp. 49–50; Samuel McCracken, “The Happy Horseman,” Commentary, February 1982, pp. 78–80; William Letwin, “The Static Theory of Progress,” Policy Review, no. 25 (Summer 1983), pp. 104-107. For the latter, see, e.g., Garrett Hardin, “Dr. Pangloss Meets Cassandra,” The New Republic, October 28, 1981, pp. 31–34; Herman E. Daly, review of The Ultimate Resource, by Julian Simon, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 1982, pp. 39–42; C. Peter Timmer, Ismail Sirageldin, John Kantner, Samuel H. Preston, “Review Symposium,” Population and Development Review, vol. 8, no. 1 (March 1982), pp. 163–177; Herman E. Daly, “Ultimate Confusion: The Economics of Julian Simon,” Futures, vol. 17, no. 5 (October 1985), pp. 446–450; F. E. Trainer, “A Critical Examination of The Ultimate Resource and The Resourceful Earth,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 30 (1986), pp. 19–37.
39. See John Attarian, “Requiem for the Right,” The Occidental Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 2004), p. 19.
40. Quoted in Jared Taylor, “The Racial Revolution,” American Renaissance, vol. 10, no. 5 (October 1999), p. 6.
41. Brimelow, Alien Nation, pp. 107–108.
42. Peter Brimelow, "Time to Rethink Immigration?," National Review, June 22, 1992.